Collective Bargaining in the Federal Service: The Permissible Scope of Negotiations under Executive Order 11,491 by Zimmer, Alexander J.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 1
1974
Collective Bargaining in the Federal Service: The
Permissible Scope of Negotiations under Executive
Order 11,491
Alexander J. Zimmer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Alexander J. Zimmer, Collective Bargaining in the Federal Service: The Permissible Scope of Negotiations under Executive Order 11,491, 25
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 193 (1974)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol25/iss1/14
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL
SERVICE: THE PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF
NEGOTIATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 11,491
Focusing on the decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Coun-
cil, the author outlines the parameters of collective bargaining in the
federal service under Executive Order 11,491. The resolution of
disputes over the negotiability of union proposals is discussed within
the context of the Order, and the role of the Civil Service Commis-
sion in the Council's decision-making process is given special atten-
tion. In addition, the author describes, and offers an alternative to,
the limiting effect on the scope of negotiations of agency-wide regu-
lations under the current Order.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE PRESENT FEDERAL labor-management relations program hasevolved from a series of executive orders1 that were de-
signed to accommodate the interests of both labor and management
within the context of the public service.2 The Lloyd-LaFollette Act
of 19123 established the right of federal employees to become mem-
bers of labor organizations, yet the government did not formally take
-up the challenge of developing a uniform labor relations policy until
the promulgation of Executive Order 10,9884 in 1962 by President
Kennedy. 5  Although -heralded as -the watershed in .the long history
1. President Kennedy promulgated Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R.
521 (1964), in January 1962. President Nixon promulgated Exec. Order
No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. § 262 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971), in October 1969.
Exec. Order No. 11,491 was amended in August 1971, by Executive Order
No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973), and is currently under review in preparation
for further revision. GoV'T Emp. RFL. REP. No. 523, at A-6 (1973).
2. PREsiDENT's STUDY COMMirrEE ON LAnOR-MANAGEMENT RELATONs IN
r FEEAL SERvicE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON LAoR-MANAGE-
MENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE INTRODUCTION (Aug. 1969) [here-
inafter cited as 1969 REPORT].
3. 37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. H9 7101-02 (1970): 'The
right of persons employed in the civil service of the United States, either indi-
vidually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any member thereof, or to fur-
nish information to either House of Congress, or to any Committee thereof
shall not be denied or interfered with." The Act did not, however, establish
the right of unions to bargain collectively with governmental agencies.
4. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1963).
5. During the 50 years following the passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act,
37 Stat. 555 (1912), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 7101-02 (1970), little attention
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of attempts to establish a formal program of labor relations in the
federal service, 6 the Kennedy Order placed definite constraints on
-the obligations of a government agency to negotiate, the most obvious
limit being the exclusion of wages and salaries as bargainable items.7
In spite of the limited scope of negotiations, there is little doubt
that the Kennedy Order made significant strides toward providing
employees an opportunity for participation in the development of
policies and procedures that affected conditions of employment.8
was directed toward the development of a uniform labor-management program
in the federal service. See generally Hampton, Federal Labor-Management
Relations: A Program in Evolution, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 493, 494 (1972). As
a result, federal employee unionism under the Act was manifested in the form
of lobbying in Congress for legislation on both bread-and-butter issues and con-
ditions of employment. Id. at 504. In the period following World War II,
however, proposals for legislation to establish a uniform federal labor relations
program were a source of major political controversy. Three such legislative
attempts were initiated unsuccessfully in the 1950's. See Mathews, Federal La-
bor Relations: A Program in Transition, 21 CATH. U.L. REV. 512, 516 & n.21
(1972).
Nevertheless, toward the end of the 1960 presidential campaign, then-Sena-
tor John F. Kennedy predicted that proposals for a formal federal labor rela-
tions program would receive more sympathetic treatment from a Democratic
administration. D. WALLETr & D. SEARS, LABOR RELATIONS AND SoCIAL PROB-
LEMS, UNIT FouR, COLLECTIVE BARGANING IN PuBLIc EMPLOYMENT 29
(1971). In 1961, President Kennedy fulfilled his own prediction by creating
a special task force to investigate the need for and the desirability of a formal
program for labor-management relations in the federal service. Id. The Task
Force found: (1) there was no uniform labor relations policy in the federal
service; (2) unions could contribute to the efficiency and effectiveness of gov-
ernmental operations; (3) one-third of all government workers were already
organized into unions; (4) there did not need to be any conflict between collec-
tive bargaining and the merit system; and (5) dissimilarities between the pri-
vate and public sectors made a direct transfer of private sector techniques and
policies to the federal service impossible. REPORT OF THE PRESMENT's TASK
FORCE ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
(1961). On the basis of the findings of the Task Force, President Kennedy
promulgated Exec. Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1963).
6. Barrett, Governmental Response to Public Unionism and Recognition
of Employee Rights: Trends and Alternatives for Resolving Issues, 51 ORE.
L. REV. 113, 114 (1971).
7. In addition, the permissible scope of negotiations did not extend to the
mission of the particular agency involved, to the budget, to the organization
and assignment of personnel, or to work technology under the Kennedy Order.
Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. 521, 524 (1963). Moreover, every
agreement between a local Agency "activity" (a term denoting specific operat-
ing unit of an agency, such as a particular Veteran's Administration hospital
or Naval shipyard) and a union required approval by the head of the agency
involved, though the Order itself contained no standards for such approval. Id.
8. The 1969 REPORT, supra note 2, Introduction stated:
[Executive Order 10,988] noted that employee-management relations
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The President's Study Commission Report and Recommendations is-
sued in August 1969 announced that negotiations had led to im-
provements in a number of areas: -the scheduling of hours of work,
overtime, rest periods, and leave; safety and industrial health prac-
tices; training and promotion policies; grievance handling; and
"many other matters of significance to employees and manage-
ment."9
Despite these improvements, the 1969 Report noted a need for
changes in the area of the permissible scope of negotiations. 10 The
Report (1) recognized managements tendency to interpretthe Order
in the federal service should be improved by providing employees an
opportunity for greater participation in developing policies and proce-
dures affecting the conditions of their employment, while preserving
the public interest as the paramount consideration....
We find that the 1962 Order produced some excellent results,
beneficial to both agencies and employees. This has been acknowl-
edged by practically all concerned.
9. Id.
10. Certain limitations upon the scope of negotiations had been given an
overly broad interpretation in many cases, restricting the number of negotiable
items. For example, the right of an agency to assign personnel had been
viewed as precluding negotiations over procedures that management employed
in assigning work shifts and overtime. 1969 REPORT, supra note 2, § El. The
true intention of such reserved management right, however, had been to reserve
an agency's unilateral right to establish staffing patterns for its organization
and for the accomplishment of its work. Accordingly, the 1969 Report rec-
ommended that an expanded explanation of an agency's reserve right to assign
personnel be adopted and suggested the following language, which was incor-
porated into Executive Order 11,491: "Whe number of employees and the
number, types and grades of positions, or employees assigned to an organiza-
tional unit, work project or tour of duty [shall be excluded from the scope of
negotiations]. . . ." Id.
Labor organizations also complained that agencies had unduly restricted the
range of negotiable matters through their regulatory power. Id. § E2. The
1969 Report concurred. Instead of recommending a formal change in the lan-
guage of the Order, however, the Report merely announced a policy of discour-
aging overly proscriptive regulations, which could hinder negotiations. Id.
In other areas the 1969 Report did propose changes in the language of the
Kennedy Order. While recommending the retention of the requirement that
the agency head approve all negotiated agreements, the 1969 Report suggested
the addition of limiting language in the Order, as a guide to such "approval
decisions," so as to prevent the arbitrary rejection of agreements negotiated at
the activity level. The recommended addition was that "approval or disap-
proval should be based solely upon the agreement's conformity with laws, exist-
ing published agency policies and regulations (unless the agency has granted
an exception to a policy or regulation) and with the regulations of other ap-
propriate authorities." Id. § E4. As an additional clarification of the permis-
sible scope of negotiations, the Report stated that arrangements for employees
adversely affected by the realignment of work forces or technological change
should also be negotiable. Id. § El.
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as favoring a narrow scope of negotiations, (2) recognized the need
to clarify the permissible scope of negotiations, and (3) selected as
a method of clarification more specific language in an expanded
"statutory" treatment of -the scope of negotiations. ,In response to
the 1969 Report, President Nixon issued Executive Order 11,4911"
on October 24, 1969, which also imposed significant limitations on
-the scope of negotiations. The delineation of these limitations is the
first object of -this Note. In evaluating the present scope of negotia-
tions in the federal service, attention will be focused on negotiability
questions that have arisen in response to union proposals involving
working conditions, agency regulations, work and scheduling assign-
ments, work preservation, and merit promotions.
While lines that designate 'the general boundaries of the scope
of negotiations may be drawn, they are of practical significance only
if they provide a meaningful 'guide to the persons involved in the
negotiation process itself. It is clear -that management negotiators
will seek to narrow the scope of -negotiations, while union negotiators
will seek to expand it.1 2 Since well over 50 percent of all federal
workers are represented by exclusive bargaining units,13 the effect
of the delay and animosity that may be produced by -the conflicting
aims of labor and management can hardly be underestimated. If
collective bargaining is to be effective and efficient, the Order gov-
erning the negotiation process must furnish guidelines which will mini-
mize such conflicts. Accordingly, the second object of this Note is
to evaluate the current Order as the primary source of guidance with
respect to the scope of negotiations for those who actually sit at the
bargaining table.
II. DEFINING THE PERMISSIBLE
SCOPE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE
Sections 11(a), 11(b), and 12(b) of Executive Order 11,491
define the permissible scope of negotiations. 14 Section 11(a) estab-
lishes the general obligation of management and labor to bargain
11. 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
12. Plunkett, The Seminar in Retrospect, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN
M PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 188 (K. Warner ed. 1969).
13. Since 1961, growth in union organization within the federal service has
been dramatic. In 1973, 56 percent of the total nonpostal federal work force
(more than one million employees) were represented by union locals--an in-
crease of 44 percent, more than 800,000 employers over 1964. GOV'T EMP.
REL. REP. No. 544, at D-9-10 (March 4, 1974).
14. 3 C.F.R. 262, 268, 269 (1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
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with respect to personnel policies and practices and -matters affecting
working conditions. 15 The obligation is mandatory, so long as bar-
gaining is consistent with "applicable laws and regulations," including
the general personnel policies contained in the Federal Personnel
Manual, published agency regulations, and existing labor-management
agreements negotiated at higher levels in -the agency1 6 Section 11
(b) specifically excludes from the scope of negotiations the mis-
sion of the agency, the budget and organization, the numbers, -types
and grades of positions or employees assigned to an organizational
unit, work project, or tour of duty, and the technology employed in
performing work.17 In addition, section 12(b) of the Order provides
that management shall retain the following nonnegotiable rights:
(1) to direct employees of the agency;' 8
(2) to hire, promote, transfer, assign, and retain employees
in positions within -the agency, and to suspend, demote,
discharge, or 'take other disciplinary action against
employees; 19
(3) to relieve employees from duty because of lack of
work or for other legitimate reasons; 20
15. Id. at 268.
Sec. 11. Negotiation of agreements. (a) An agency and a labor
organization that has been accorded exclusive recognition, through
appropriate representatives, shall meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to personnel policies and practices and mat-
ters affecting working conditions, so far as may be appropriate under
applicable laws and regulations, including policies set forth in the
Federal Personnel Manual, published agency policies and regulations,
a national or other controlling agreement at a higher level in the
agency, and this Order. They may negotiate an agreement, or any
question arising thereunder, determine appropriate techniques, consis-
tent with section 17 of this Order, to assist in such negotiation; and
execute a written agreement or memorandum of understanding.
16. Id.
17. Id. § 11:
(b) In prescribing regulations relating to personnel policies and
practices and working conditions, an agency shall have due regard for
the obligation imposed by paragraph (a) of this section. However,
the obligation to meet and confer does not include matters with re-
spect to the mission of an agency; its budget; its organization; the
number of employees; and the numbers, types, and grades of positions
or employees assigned to an organizational unit, work project, or tour
of duty; the technology of performing its work; or its internal security
practices. This does not preclude the parties from negotiating agree-
ments providing appropriate arrangements for employees adversely af-
fected by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological
change.
18. Id. at 269, § 12(b)(1).
19. Id. § 12(b)(2).
20. Id. § 12(b)(3).
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(4) to maintain the efficiency of the Government oper-
ations entrusted to them;21
(5) to determine the methods, means, and personnel by
which such operations are to be conducted; 22 and
(6) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry
out the mission of the agency in situations of emer-
gency. 23
Executive Order 11,49124 is clearly based on the findings and
recommendations of the 1969 Report. The limits of negotiations are
set forth by the delineation of specific nonnegotiable areas and by
a comprehensive list of reserved management rights which are incor-
porated into every agreement. 2r The emphasis on .the exceptions to
the obligation -to bargain reveals something of the nature of the Order
itself, for it provides management an arsenal of language with which
-to limit negotiations. Thus, there is a question whether the Order
contains an implied structural bias favoring a narrow scope of nego-
tiations.
The broad language used to limit negotiations raises the addi-
tional question whether such language provides significant guidance
to negotiators. The language of -the Order can best be evaluated
and analyzed by viewing past interpretations of the Order in the con-
,text of specific negotiability questions which 'have arisen during the
collective bargaining process. To resolve conflicts in interpretation,
the Order establishes the Federal Labor Relations Council as the
final arbiter of such negotiability questions 26 and makes the Council
21. Id. § 12(b)(4).
22. Id. § 12(b)(5).
23. Id. § 12(b)(6).
24. Exec. Order No. 11,491 was amended in 1971 by Exec. Order No.
11,616, 3 C.F.R. 262 (1973). The amendments are significant with respect
to the scope of negotiations in only one regard: Section 20 of the Exec.
Order No. 11,491 was changed so that parties are now permitted to nego-
tiate within limits on the issue of the use of official time by employee represen-
tatives in negotiating an agreement. Exec. Order No. 11,616, § 1, 3 C.F.R.
262 (1973).
25. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12(b), 3 C.F.R. 269 (1973), 5 U.S.C. §
7301 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
26. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 4(a), 3 C.F.R. 262, 264 (1973), 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1971), established the Federal Labor Relations Council [herein-
after referred to as the Council], which consists of the chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, who acts as chairman of the Council, the Secretary of
Labor, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Section
4(c) (2) empowers the Council to consider appeals. Section 11 (c) outlines the
appeals rrocedure and provides:
(c) If, in connection with negotiations, an issue develops as to
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the ultimate authority on the scope of the obligation to bargain. Ac-
cordingly, the Council's interpretations clarify the meaning of the
Order and serve to define the limits of negotiations. Many of the
Council's decisions illustrate possible management bias in the Order
and highlight the issues that produce the greatest degree of uncer-
tainty in determining the permissible scope of negotiations.
A. Matters Affecting Working Conditions
In an early case, AFGE Local 2595 and Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service, U.S. Border Patrol, Yuma Sector,27 the Council
was called upon to interpret the meaning of the phrase "matter[s]
affecting working conditions" as used in section 11(a) of the Order.
The agency argued that the union proposal, which required negotia-
tions over health and safety standards in connection with -the main-
tenance of roads used in border surveillance, violated the prohibition
in section 11(b) against negotiating the technology for performing
work.28  The Council found that the proposal was intended merely
to reduce the chance of injury and disease.29 As such, the subject
of the proposal was a "matter affecting working conditions" and
hence was negotiable, subject to the additional qualifications set out
in sections ll(a), 11(b), and 12(b) of -the Order.3 0 The Council
specifically held that proposals setting safety standards were negoti-
able, so long as such proposals did not attempt to make negotiable
whether a proposal is contrary to law, regulation, controlling agree-
ment, or this Order and therefore not negotiable, it shall be resolved
as follows:
(1) An issue which involves interpretation of a controlling agree-
ment at a higher agency level is resolved under the procedures of the
controlling agreement, or, if none, under agency regulations;
(2) An issue other than as described in subparagraph (1) of this
paragraph which arises at a local level may be referred by either
party to the head of the agency for determination;
(3) An agency head's determination as to the interpretation of
the agency's regulations with respect to a proposal is final;
(4) A labor organization may appeal to the Council for a deci-
sion when-
(i) It disagrees with an agency head's determination that a pro-
posal would violate applicable law, regulation of appropriate authority
outside the agency, or this Order, or
(ii) it believes that an agency's regulations, as interpreted by the
agency head, violate applicable law, regulation of appropriate author-
ity outside the agency or this Order.
27. Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7007 (1971).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 21:7008. For text of sections 11(a), 11(b), and 12(b), see notes
15, 17 supra and text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
1974]
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how the standards would be achieved. 31 As a result, -the Council's
ruling left the ,union with a voice in determining an important aspect
of the work environment, health and safety standards, and, at the
same time, recognized the unilateral right of the agency -to determine
'how such standards would be implemented.3 2
B. The Limitation of Applicable Regulations
Since published agency regulations and policies, including the
policies set forth in ,the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel
Manual, supercede and -limit both the obligation to 'bargain3 3 and the
content of negotiated agreements, 34 differences in the interpretation
of such regulations and policies are inevitable. Such conflicts in in-
terpretation may involve the regulations or policies of an agency that
31. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 2595 and Immigration and
Nationalization Serv., U.S. Border Patrol, Yuma Sector, Gov'T. EMr. REL.
REP. 21:7007 (1971). In addition, the Council rejected management's con-
tention that the proposal infringed management's reserved rights under §
12(b) (1), (4), and (5) to direct employees, maintain the efficiency of opera-
tion and determine methods, means, and personnel by which the activity's
operations are to be conducted.
32. Few persons would quarrel with the Council's decision that health and
safety standards are matters affecting working conditions. Nevertheless, a look
at cases recently decided by the Council reveals that relatively few negotiabil-
ity questions are as clear-.cut as health and safety issues. Therefore, to avoid
constant resort to the Council to settle negotiability questions, both labor and
management must be aware of the criteria employed by the Council in arriving
at its own determinations. First, the Council uses its prior decisions as prece-
dent. See, e.g., Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of Charleston, AFL-
CIO and Charleston Naval Shipyard, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7105 (1973);
Tidewater Va. Employees Metal Trades Council and Naval Pub. Works
Cent., Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7093, (1973); Local 174, Am. Fed'n of Tech-
nical Eng'rs, AFL-CIO and Supships, USN, 11th Naval Dist., Gov'T EM!'.
REL. REP. 21:7099 (1973). The Council also has made extensive use of
the 1969 Report as a substitute for legislative history, which the Executive
Order by definition lacks. See International Ass'n of Machinists and Aero-
space Workers and U.S. Kirk Army Hosp., Gov'T EMp. REL. REP. 21:7005
(1971) (1969 Report cited for its approval of the negotiability of binding ar-
bitration over the interpretation of contracts), American Fed'n of Gov't Em-
ployees Local 1668 and Elmendorf Air Force Base, Gov'T EMp. REL. REP.
21:7071 (1973) (citing the 1969 Report as a "source of legislative intent" for
the proposition that the extent of the negotiated grievance procedure should
be determined by the parties through negotiation, at 21:7072-73).
On the other hand, the fact that similar proposals had been negotiated by
other agencies has been given no weight in the resolution of negotiability dis-
putes. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and U.S.
Kirk Army Hosp., Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7005, 21:7006 (1971).
33. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 11(a), 3 C.F.R. 262, 268 (1973), 5 U.S.C.
7301 (1971).
34. Id. § 12(a).
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is -not an actual party to the negotiations. This situation may arise
where a union claims that an agency regulation violates existing Civil
Service Commission policies as expressed in the Federal Personnel
Manual.35  On the other hand, -the negotiating agency may argue
that a union proposal violates the agency's own regulations.36  In
both situations the question whether a union proposal violates a pol-
icy or regulation is finally determined by the head of the agency that
issued it.37 The validity of the policy or regulation may also be sub-
ject -to dispute.38 Where -the validity of a regulation is in issue, the
initial resolution of the controversy is performed by the head of the
agency involved in the negotiations. 39 A labor union, however, may
appeal the agency head's decision on the validity of a regulation or
policy ,to the Council.40
Where the controversy has involved an alleged conflict between
agency regulations and Civil Service Commission regulations, the
Council has declined to render its own interpretation of the latter
and has relied, instead, on the advisory opinions of the Commission.
Such a practice has been justified on the theory that the Civil Service
Commission has the primary responsibility for interpreting its own
regulations.41 Thus, when a union urged that an agency regulation
that required a greater number of actual work 'hours -to qualify fire-
men for premium pay than were required by -the Federal Personnel
Manual was invalid as conflicting with Civil Service Commission reg-
ulations, the Council referred -the question -to the Commission.42 In
rejecting the union's contention, the Council adopted the opinion of
the Commission that the regulations involved established minimum
standards only, which could be modified upward by agency regula-
tions.43
35. See, e.g., note 42 infra and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., notes 42-47 infra and accompanying text. An agency may
also argue that a union proposal conflicts with a statute, thereby rendering the
proposal nonnegotiable. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Gov't Employees Local
R3-84 and Washington, D.C., Air Nat'l Guard, Gov'T EMp. REL. REP. 21:7063
(1973).
37. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 11(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 262, 268 (1973), 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
38. Notes 58-63 infra and accompanying text.
39. Exec. Order No. 11,491, §§ 11(c)(1), (2), 3 C.F.R. 262, 268 (1973),
5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
40. Exec. Order No. 11,491, §§ 11(c)(4)(i), (ii), 3 C.F.R. 262, 269
(1973), 5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
41. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 2197 and Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, Gov'T EMS,. REL. REP. 21:7009 (1971).
42. Id. The controversy involved the Federal Personnel Manual §§
550.14 1-550.144(a) (1).
43. Id.
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In another case, National Association of Federal Employees Lo-
cal 779 and Department of Air Force, Sheppard Air Base,44 the Air
Training Command, pursuant to a Department of Air Force regula-
tion on merit promotions,45 issued a regulation prescribing a compre-
hensive merit promotion plan applicable to activities throughout the
Command. 46 The Command's regulation prohibited modifications of
the plan by subordinate activities. In accordance with this prohibi-
tion, a subsequent union proposal concerning merit promotions at
Sheppard Air Base was held nonnegotiable by the agency head.47
On appeal to -the Council, the union contended that since the regu-
lation precluded activity-level negotiations on merit promotion plans,
it violated Civil Service Commission requirements. 48  In accordance
with its usual practice, 49 the Council asked the Commission ito inter-
pret the applicable portion of the Federal Personnel Manual, Chap-
ter 335. In response, the Commission noted that Chapter 335 in-
struoted agencies on the negotiation of merit promotion plans. Nev-
ertheless, since its regulations did not directly address the issue
whether negotiations at the activity level could be prohibited by a
higher authority, the Commission found that the Air Training Com-
mand regulation did not violate Civil Service Regulations. 50  The
Council adopted the Commission's findings. 51 Under Sheppard,
then, a regulation promulgated at an intermediate level in an agency,
such as the Air Training Command, will be valid with respect to Civil
Service Commission Regulations, unless it conflicts with specific Civil
Service Commission requirements. This reasoning applies with
equal force to regulations promulgated at the highest level of an
agency.52 In this respect agencies are given 'great leeway in promul-
gating regulations, even when such regulations 'have a significant con-
stricting effect on the scope of negotiations.
44. GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7047 (1973).
45. Dep't of Air Force Reg. 40-335.
46. Air Training Command Reg. 40-3.
47. See National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 779 and Department of
Air Force, Sheppard Air Base, GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7047 (1973).
48. Id. The Civil Service Regulation was in the Federal Personnel Man-
ual chapter 335, subchapter 5.
49. GOV'T EMp. REL. REP. at 21:7049.
50. Id. at 21:7049-50.
51. Id.
52. See Local 2424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers and
Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7081 (1973), where the
Council deferred to the Civil Service Commission on the definition of "brief
period," as used in the Federal Personnel Manual chapter 300, §§ 8-3(b), 8-4e,
to define the period of a work assignment that involves a temporary promotion.
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The mechanical adoption of the Civil Service Commission's ad-
visory opinions may be viewed simply as evidencing the Council's
respect for the authority of the Commission. This is so because the
Order in no way diminishes the authority of the Commission to set
personnel policy for the Executive Branch. Moreover, if the Council
were to render its own interpretation of Civil Service Commission
regulations, confusion over the meaning of such regulations could re-
sult. The Council might adopt an interpretation for the purposes of
a -negotiability question that would conflict with the interpretation
given the regulation by the Civil Service Commission in another con-
text. Sheppard could have presented this very situation. Had the
Air Training Command sought the Commission's advice before it
promulgated its merit promotion regulation, the Commission presum-
ably would have approved the regulation. The Council, on the other
hand, could have ruled that the Air Training Command regulation
contravened Civil Service Commission policy as set out in the Federal
Personnel Manual. Such a conclusion by the Council would have
been reasonable, since Chapter 335 of the Manual permits, at a min-
imum, limited negotiations regarding merit promotion proposals,53 so
that a regulation precluding all negotiations over such proposals could
violate the spirit of the chapter.
Although the Order provides that "an agency head's determina-
tion of the agency's regulations with respect to a proposal is final,"54
the practice of giving the Civil Service Commission's advisory opin-
ions binding force diminishes the role of the Council as the final ar-
biter of negotiability disputes. Admittedly, the Council is faced with
a Hobson's choice: If it relies solely on the Commission's interpreta-
tions, the Council diminishes its own authority; if it renders its own
interpretations, the Council risks confusion over the meaning of Civil
Service Regulations.55 In adopting the former alternative the Coun-
cil, in effect, cedes jurisdiction over disputes concerning -the effect
of Civil Service Commission regulations to the Commission itself.
Moreover, since -the union's right to contest the validity of regulations
The Commission found that the Department of Army's rule that a temporary
promotion was not permissible in an assignment of less than 60 days was not
in conflict with "brief period" as used in the Federal Personnel Manual. Id.
at 7082.
53. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 779 and Department of Air
Force, Sheppard Air Base, Gov'T EmI. REL. RP. 21:7047, 21:7048 n.4
(1973).
54. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § ll(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. 262, 268 (1973), 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
55. Text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
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extends only to the regulations of the negotiating agency,56 the pro-
priety of Civil Service regulations is not subject to review in negoti-
ability appeals. Given the pervasive application of Civil Service reg-
ulations, the Order, as interpreted 'by the Council, provides the Civil
Service Commission with extraordinary power to limit the scope of
negotiations. Consequently, -the ability of the Council to speak with
authority on -the permissible scope of negotiations is significantly cir-
cumscribed. Indeed, the Civil Service Commisson's interpretations
have placed within the agencies the power -to limit negotiations
through regulations of general application.5 7 Such regulations tend
to block negotiations at the local level. 58
On the other hand, -the Council has held that the scope of nego-
tiations is not limited by agency regulations dealing only with condi-
tions of employment in an individual activity. In United Federation
of College Teachers Local 1460 and U.S. Merchant Marine Acad-
emy, 59 a union proposal would have been negotiable but for a De-
partment of Commerce regulation. However, since it was directed
specifically at the Academy's faculty, the Council refused to consider
the regulation as limiting the scope of negotiations. The Council
specifically held that only those regulations and policies "issued to
achieve a desirable degree of uniformity and equality in the admin-
istration of matters common to all employees of the agency, or at
least to employees of more than one subordinate activity," were per-
mitted to limit the scope of negotiations."0 To interpret the Order
otherwise, the Council reasoned, would permit ad hoc limitations on
the scope of negotiations and make a mockery of the bargaining ob-
ligation.61
The validity of agency-wide regulations presents a more difficult
question. Section II(b) of -the Order requires that in prescribing
regulations relating ,to working conditions and personnel practices
and policies, an agency shall have due regard for the obligation to
bargain imposed by section 11(a). It would seem that the validity
of agency regulations could be determined by viewing the regulation
56. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § II(c)(4)(ii), 3 C.F.R. 262, 269 (1973),
5 U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
57. Notes 50-54 supra and accompanying text.
58. Remarks of John Will, Director of Personnel, Department of Com-
merce, at the Federal Bar Association National Conference on Labor Relations
in the Federal Service: A Practical Look at Critical Issues, Sept. 24-25, 1973.
59. United Fed'n of College Teachers Local 1460 and U.S. Merchant Ma-
rine Academy, Gov'T EMp. REL. RaP. 21:7019 (1972).
60. Id. at 21:7021.
61. Id. at 21:7021.
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against the areas in which bargaining is required by the Order. The
language of the Order, however, precludes -the use of such a tech-
nique, since section 11(a) prohibits bargaining over agency regula-
tions, and since the Order does not set out any reserved employee
rights that, like the designated management rights, may not 'be in-
fringed.62  Thus, from the union's point of view, the Order contains
a catch-22 that protects the validity of agency regulations. In formu-
lating its regulations the agency is to be mindful of its obligation to
bargain, but the obligation to bargain does not extend to -the regula-
tions so promulgated. As a result, when a union proposal would be
negotiable but for an agency-wide regulation, and the validity of such
regulation is in dispute, ,the question is not strictly whether the regu-
lation is overly proscriptive. Rather, the Council has determined
that the real question is whether the regulation involved is valid on
its own merits.63 The -test to be applied is 'the same one employed
in dealing with agency regulations directed at a single activity.64 If
it was issued to achieve some degree of uniformity and equality in
administration of matters common to all employees, the regulation
will not be held to improperly restrict negotiations.65  Thus, the
Council has held that a regulation precluding activity-level negotia-
tions over merit promotion proposals was a proper restriction on the
scope of negotiations, since the regulation applied uniformly through-
out the issuer's command.66
It is 'apparent that the narrowing impact of such regulations on
the scope of negotiations is considerable. In fact, the Council has
noted that the practice of issuing explicit -regulations on matters relat-
ing to personnel practices and working conditions reduces the scope
of bargaining and is -therefore of doubtful wisdom.6 Nevertheless,
under the language of the present order, the Council is bound to ap-
ply the Merchant Marine test66 in determining the validity of agency-
wide regulations.69 It appears, then, that the Order will be inter-
62. Notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
63. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 779 and Department of Air
Force, Sheppard Air Base, GoVT EMP. REL. REP. 21:7047, 21:7048-49
(1973).
64. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
65. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees Local 779 and Department of Air
Force, Sheppard Air Base, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7047, 21:7049 (1973).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 21:7049.
68. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
69. Accord, Seattle Center Controller's Union and FAA, GOV'T EMT'. REL.
REP. 21:7067 (1973), where the Council held an FAA regulation issued to
strengthen administrative and technical supervision of air traffic control per-
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preted to give the widest possible latitude to the formulation and ap-
plication of agency and Civil Service Commission regulations, regard-
less of the effect on the scope of negotiations.
C. Work Assignments and Scheduling
The 1969 Report's recommendations 70 relating to the assignment
of personnel were incorporated in Executive Order 11,491 in the
hope of clarifying the negotiability of proposals.71 The Order pro-
vides that "the obligation to meet and confer does not include mat-
ters with respect to. . . numbers, types and grades of positions...
assigned to [a] . . . tour of duty."'7-  Nevertheless, the determina-
tion of an agency's power to assign personnel -to projects and shifts
has continued to be a source of conflict at the bargaining table. In
resolving such conflicts, however, the Council has refrained from
adopting an expansive interpretation of ,the language of the Order,
-thus avoiding a construction that could lead to a further narrowing
of the permissible scope of negotiations.
The Council has modified its earlier hard-line stance on -the nego-
tiability of work assignment proposals. Its earlier approach, which
seemed ,to portend a narrow scope of negotiations in the area of work
assignments, was expressed in AFGE Local 194 and Plum Island
Animal Disease Laboratory.73  There the Council held: "[The
specific right of an agency to determine the 'numbers, types and
grades of positions or employees' assigned to a shift or tour of duty,
as provided in section 11 (b), obviously subsumes .the agency's right
to fix or change -the number and duration of those shifts or tours."17 4
Subsequently, however, the Council rendered a decision that substan-
tially eased the narrowing effect on the scope of negotiations of the
sonnel and to develop a career development program to be consistent with the
test announced in Merchant Marine Academy, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7019
(1972). The Council also held that making the impact of technological devel-
opments negotiable did not mean that the realignment of the work force itself
caused by such changes was negotiable. Id. at 7069. Cf. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees Local 2595 and Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S.
Border Patrol, Yuma Sector, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7007 (1971); see note
22 supra and accompanying text.
70. Note 10 supra and accompanying text; 1969 REPORT, supra note 2, §
El.
71. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 11(b), 3 C.F.R. 262, 268 (1973), 5 U.S.C.
§ 7301 (1971).
72. Id. "Tour of duty" refers to an employee's general ongoing work as-
signment.
73. GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7013 (1971).
74. Id.
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Plum Island holding. In Federal Employees Metal Trades Council
of Charleston and U.S. Naval Supply Center75 the Council held that
a union proposal to establish a basic Monday-through-Friday work-
week at a 24-hour-a-day, seven-day-a-week activity was negoti-
able.76 Plum Island was distinguished on the ground that the num-
ber and duration of the tours of duty at the activity in that case were
"integrally related" to the numbers and types of workers assigned to
those tours. Taken together, the duration and composition of the
tours of duty comprised an essential part of Plum Island's staffing
patterns (the number and types of workers assigned -to accomplish
the agency's work), a subject which is expressly nonnegotiable under
section 11(b) of the Order.77  The Council did not find that the
union's basic workweek proposal in U.S. Naval Supply Center simi-
larly affected -the staffing patterns of the activity, since there was no
indication that the proposal in question was "integrally related in any
manner to the numbe/rs and types of employees involved."'78
On the basis of these opinions, a basic workweek proposal is ne-
gotiable unless the agency can show that -there is an integral relation-
ship between the work assignment proposal and the activity's staffing
patterns-the numbers, types, or grades of positions to be assigned
at specific times during the workweek. Thus, -the modification of
the broad limitation on bargaining implicit in the Plum Island deci-
sion makes it clear that the burden is on an agency to show that
a work assignment proposal conflicts with the agency's right to estab-
lish staffing patterns. Such a rule is consistent with the 1969 Re-
port's goal of permitting a wider range of negotiations in the area
of policies and practices relating to work assignments.79
Proposals affecting shift scheduling and overtime are also related
to questions involving the assignment of personnel. The point of in-
quiry with respect to such proposals is the retained management right
'"to maintain the efficiency of government operations entrusted to
75. Gov'T Emp. REL. RP. 21:7033 (1972).
76. The Council held that, since the proposal was not "integrally related"
to the agency's staffing patterns, it was negotiable as a matter affecting work-
ing conditions. Id.
77. Id. at 21:7034.
78. Id. See also Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of Charleston,
AFL-CIO and Charleston Naval Shipyard, Gov'T EmIP. REL. REP. 21:7105,
21:7106 (1973), in which the Council ruled, in part, that a union proposal
involving the number of employees assigned to a non-Monday-through-Friday
workweek was nonnegotiable, since it was "integrally related" to staffing pat-
terns. Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of Charleston, AFL-CIO and
Charleston Naval Shipyard, GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7103, 7104 (1973).
79. 1969 REPORT, supra note 2, § El.
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[it]."8° In Local 2219, IBEW and Department of Army, Corps of
Engineers, Little Rock District,8" the union's proposal would have
prevented the rescheduling of swing shifts at a 24-hour-a-day activity
to avoid the payment of overtime to swing men. The agency argued
-that ,the proposal, which required the payment of overtime in certain
situations regardless of whether the employee had worked his full 40-
hour week82 violated the reserved management right to maintain the
efficiency of ,the government operations entrusted -to it.83 The
agency reasoned that the proposals would circumscribe its efforts in
reducing premium pay costs, thereby impairing its ability to maintain
efficiency and economy in agency operations. The Council rejected
the agency's position, however, and held that increased costs were
not necessarily incompatible with -the efficient operation of govern-
ment activities. In fact, the Council found that there was a real
probability that the union's proposals might increase efficiency be-
cause of -their favorable impact on employee morale.8 4 In addition
to the improvement in employee morale, the Council noted other po-
tential benefits from -the union's proposal, such as increased produc-
tivity, employee responsiveness to direction, reduced turnovers, fewer
grievances, and contributions by employees of money-saving ideas.85
Thus, the Council has recognized the importance of overtime ar-
rangements to employees as a matter affecting working conditions
and has held that overtime proposals are not invariably related to
an agency's staffing patterns.86 As a result, U.S. Naval Supply Cen-
ter permits negotiations over such proposals unless ,the agency dem-
80. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 12(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. 262, 269 (1973), 5
U.S.C. § 7301 (1971).
81. GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7023 (1972).
82. The proposal provided that a swing man would be paid overtime
should he be rescheduled to work on a holiday or weekend. Id.
83. Id. at 21:7024.
84. One of the primary purposes of the union proposal was to eliminate,
or at least soften, the demoralizing effect of last-minute shift changes and the
resulting uncertainty as to when workers would have days off to be with their
families. Id. at 21:7024.
85. Id. at 21:7025. See also National Joint Council of Food Inspection
Locals and Office of the Adm'r Animal and Plant Health Inspection Serv., U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7155, 21:7156 (1973).
86. Cf. Philadelphia Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO and Philadelphia
Naval Shipyard, GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7107, 21:7108 (1973), where the
Council held that the union's proposal was concerned solely with overtime and
therefore was not integrally related to staffing patterns. The proposal provided
that duties of unit employees were not to be assigned to non-unit employees
solely for the purpose of avoiding the payment of overtime to unit members.
Id. at 21:7107.
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onstrates that they are integrally related to its staffing patterns.
Moreover, under Little Rock, overtime proposals will not be held to
violate management's right to maintain efficiency in operations unless
the agency can demonstrate that increased costs or reduced effective-
ness in operations are "inescapable and significant" and "are not off-
set by compensating benefits."87
While Little Rock and U.S. Naval Supply Center permit negotia-
tions with respect to overtime and basic workweek proposals, a dif-
ferent result obtains on the question of job content. The Civil Serv-
ice Commission has advised that its job descriptions are not all-in-
clusive of the duties involved and do not prohibit the assignment of
any duties or responsibilities -to an employee by an agency.88 Under
-the rationale developed in Plum Island and U.S. Naval Supply Cen-
ter, the negotiability of job content proposals seems to depend upon
-the relationship of the proposal to the nonnegotiable area of agency
organization and staffing patterns, because the content of individual
jobs is necessarily related to the numbers, -types, and grades of posi-
tions the agency employs. In International Association of Firefight-
ers, Local F-111 and Grilliss Air Force Base, 9 the Council defined
the term "organization" as -the structure or systematic grouping of
work and determined that the worker's individual position is the low-
est building block in that structure.90 Moreover, since it is apparent
that job content relates to the duties that will be performed by the
individual positions involved, it follows that job-content proposals
must have a substantial effect on -the numbers and types of positions
to be assigned to any given work project. In fact, the Council ruled
that -the assignment of duties to individual positions is -he critical first
step in determining the staffing patterns of an agency.9 1 Accord-
87. Local 2219, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers' AFL-CIO and Depart-
ment of Army, Corps of Engineers, Little Rock Dist., Gov'T EMP. REL. REP.
21:7023 (1972).
88. See International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local F-ill and Griffiss
Air Base, Gov'T Ems,. REL. REP. 21:7059 (1973), in which the Civil Service
Commission, in reply to a request for an interpretation of one of its own di-
rectives stated: "In relation to the entire standard [the typical work examples]
are only illustrative of the distinctions drawn in the statement of characteristics
of the class and body of applicable knowledge at the time the standards were
prepared. They are not intended to be either complete or exclusive." Id. at
21:7060.
89. Gov'r Ems,. REL. REP. 21:7059 (1973).
90. Id. at 21:7061.
91. Id. at 21:7062. See also Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of
Charleston, AFL-CIO and Charleston Naval Shipyard, Gov'T EMp. RE.L. REP.
21:7103, 21:7104 (1973).
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ingly, the Council in Griffiss held that the exception from the bargain-
ing obligation of matters pertaining to the organization of an agency
precluded negotiations over -the content of the individual job.92 Such
a result was justified in view of the significant role that the assign-
ment of duties to the individual position plays in 'the determination
of agency staffing patterns.
In sum, the Order, as interpreted by the Council, opens a signif-
icant area of negotiations with respect -to work-assignment and work-
scheduling proposals. The Council's treatment of management's
right to maintain the efficiency of operations93 demonstrates an
awareness of the importance of considering the human element in
negotiability questions. 94 Such an awareness is indicated by the ad-
monition that the impact of a proposal on agency efficiency must be
measured by balancing the projected increased costs against the po-
tential increases in production resulting from the proposal's favorable
impact on employee morale.95  Indeed, the heavy burden of proof
required of an agency to demonstrate the nonnegotiability of an over-
-time proposal 9n further emphasizes the Council's position that the ini-
-tial dollar outlay is not the proper yardstick -by which to judge the
impact of a proposal on government efficiency. Moreover, the
Council's refusal to interpret broadly -the limitations of section 11(b)
strengthens the bargaining obligation that section 11(a) mandates.
Nevertheless, the boundary of negotiations appears to be fixed at the
point where a work-assignment proposal arguably interferes with
management's substantive right to control the essential organization
of its work.91
D. Work-Preservation Proposals
A federal agency may "contract out" work assignments to private
92. Id. See also Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of Charleston
and Charleston Naval Shipyard, GOV'T Emp. REL. REP. 21:7151 (1973). Nev-
ertheless, if the Order does not prevent the assignment of unrelated duties to
one position, quaere the future effect on maintaining the rigid criteria for pro-
motion in the Federal Service. One can forcefully argue that as individual
positions become more and more diversified in the scope of their duties, per-
formance will be correspondingly more difficult to evaluate.
93. See Local 2219, Int'l Bhd. of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO and De-
partment of Army, Corps of Engineers, Little Rock Dist., GOVT EMP. REr.
REP. 21:7023 (1972).
94. Id. at 21:7024.
95. Notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
96. Note 87 supra and accompanying text.
97. Notes 89-91 supra and accompanying text.
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industry -to provide for the organization of its work.98 The contract-
ing-out alternative is a well-entrenched practice in the federal gov-
ernment and is of great concern to unions representing federal em-
ployees.99 Union concern stems from a natural desire to preserve
the work and therefore the jobs of unit members.1 00  Consequently,
a union will seek to control this practice so that the working capacity
of a unit is exhausted before the agency looks elsewhere for sources
of labor.
Such an attempt -to control the assignment of work to non-unit
government employees was made by the union in Tidewater Virginia
Federal Employees Metal Trades Council and Naval Public Works
Center.101 One of -the union proposals sought to require that "work
regularly and ,historically assigned to and performed by bargaining
unit employees covered by [the] agreement [would] not be assigned
to military personnel or Public Works Center employees excluded
from the bargaining unit."102 It was found that such a proposal nec-
essarily determined the type of personnel or which employees would
conduct the particular agency operation involved. Accordingly, the
Council held that the proposal violated managements right to deter-
mine the "total body of persons" by which its operations were to be
conducted under section 12(b)(5) of the Order.10 3
98. Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-76, as revised (Aug.
30, 1967).
99. Hearings on Legislative Oversight Review of the Civil Service Comm.
Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of the House Comm. on Post Office
and Civil Service, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1972).
100. While federal employees would not lose their jobs because of "con-
tracting out," the practice has the effect of reducing the number of employees
required to perform an activity's functions, thereby reducing the number of po-
tential unit members.
101. Gov'T Em. REL. REP. 21:7093 (1973).
102. Id. at 21:7093.
103. Id. at 21:7095. Accord, Local 3, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs,
AFL-CIO, and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, GOVT EM7. REL. REP. 21:7107,
21:7108 (1973); Pattern Makers League of North America and Naval Ship
Research and Dev. Center, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7125 (1973).
In Tidewater Va. Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council and Naval
Pub. Works Center, Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. 21:7093 (1973), the Council em-
phasized that the union proposal struck at the substantive power of the agency
to exercise its management right, as distinguished from the procedures used in
the exercise of that right. Such procedures are negotiable. Veteran's Admin-
istration Independent Serv. Employees Union and Veteran's Administration
Research Hosp., Gov'T Ems,. REL. REP. 21:7029 (1972).
A second proposal was also advanced by the union. The proposal provided
in part:
Section 1. It is understood by the parties hereto that decisions re-
garding contracting work out of the unit and transfer of work within
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Though ,the Council analyzed the issues in Naval Public Works
Center under the reserved-management-rights section 12(b)(5), the
disputes over such work preservation clauses could have been re-
solved under section II(b) of the Order.104  The union's first pro-
posal defined 'the initial source of 'labor available for the performance
of work as the members of the bargaining unit. As a result, the pro-
posal determined the numbers and type of personnel the activity
could employ in assigning work. Since -the numbers and types of
personnel constitute -an activity's staffing patterns, the proposal vio-
lated -the section 11(b) 10 5 prohibition against negotiating over staff-
ing patterns. The use of section 11(b) to evaluate the negotiability
of such proposals has the advantage of discouraging management ne-
gotiators from relying on the stem language of the reserved manage-
ment right in section 12(b) (5). Management rights provisions such
as section 12(b)(5) create barriers behind which management can
refuse to negotiate. In view of its ,tendency to narrow the scope of
negotiations, 10 6 it is not surprising 'that management will resort to
such provisions whenever possible.' 07  Thus, 'the mere presence of
and reliance upon such management rights provisions has been criti-
cized as generating unnecessary negotiability disputes which hinder
the collective-bargaining process.' 08
In light of the great weight the Council placed on the Office of
Management and Budget directive' 9 encouraging contracting out
the Public Works Center are areas of discretion of the employer.
However, it will be the policy of the Employer that work normally
performed in the unit will not be contracted out or assigned to em-
ployees not in the bargaining unit, unless such work is beyond the
capacity or capability of unit employees to perform or if economic
situations or technological change dictate that such work be per-
formed outside the unit. In this regard the Employer agrees to con-
sult with the union concerning any work situation changes affecting
employees in the unit.
Id. at 7093. This proposal was held nonnegotiable for the same reasons as
the first. Tidewater Va. Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council and Naval
Pub. Works Center, Gov'r EMP. REL. REP. 21:7093, 21:7096 (1973). Ac-
cord, Local 174, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs, AFL-CIO and Supships,
USN, 11th Naval Dist., Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7099 (1973); Philadelphia
Metal Trades Council, AFL-CIO and Philadelphia Naval Shipyard, GOv'T
EMP. REL. REP. 21:7107 (1973).
104. -See note 17 supra.
105. Notes 77-79 supra and accompanying text.
106. Note 12 supra and accompanying text.
107. Plunkett, The Seminar in Retrospect, in CoLLEcTIvE BARGAI,-NG IN
THE PUBLIC SERVICE: THEORY AND PRACTICE 188 (K. Warner ed. 1969).
108. Id.
109. See note 98 supra. The directive states a general policy of relying
upon the private enterprise system to supply the government's needs except
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work by agencies, -the availability of section 1 (b) as an alternative
guide takes on greater significance. This is so because the Council's
mode of analysis gave the Office of Management and Budget (here-
inafter OMB) the power to influence the scope of negotiations sub-
stantially. While it held that the contracting-out proposal was non-
negotiable because it violated management's section 12(b)(5) right
to determine ,the personnel by which activity operations were to be
conducted, -the Council went on to say that the proposal would have
proscribed management action based on the OMB directive.1 10 Al-
though the Council disclaimed the binding effect of the OMB direc-
tive with respect to negotiations,"' it conceded that such directives,
as a statement of governmental policy, were a major consideration
in construing the scope of an agency's right under section
12(b)(5)." 2 Thus, the Council's analysis seems -to permit the OMB
through its directives ,to limit the scope of negotiations by serving as
authority for determining the substance of management's right under
section 12(b)(5).113 Such a result was clearly not intended by the
Order," 4 and it seriously undermines the independence and authority
of the Council to guide the development of the federal labor relations
program. If -the analysis of such proposals were conducted under
section 11 (b), 'however, the issue of OMB directives as defining
management rights would be avoided and the integrity of the Council
maintained. Indeed, since management's section 11(b) right to de-
termine staffing patterns appears to be coextensive with its section
where it is in the national interest for the government to provide such services
and products directly. Tidewater Va. Fed. Employees Metal Trades Coun-
cil and Naval Pub. Works Center, Gov'T Emp. REL. REP. 21:7093, 21:7096
(1973).
110. Tidewater Va. Fed. Employees Metal Trades Council and Naval
Pub. Works Center, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7093, 21:7096 (1973).
Ill. Id. See United Fed'n of College Teachers, Local 1460 and U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7019 (1972), where
the council expressly held that Office of Management and Budget direc-
fives were not to be viewed as limitations on the scope of negotiations.
112. Tidewater Va. Fed. Metal Trades Council and Naval Pub. Works
Center, Gov'T EMP. RiEL. REP. 21:7093, 21:7096 (1973).
113. See Local 174, AFL-CIO and Supships, USN, l1th Naval Dist., GOV'T
EMP. REL. REP. 21:7099 (1973). In both cases, the Council found a union
"contracting out" proposal violative of § 12(b) (5) on the basis of the discus-
sion in Naval Public Works Center.
114. The directives of the OMB should not be given the same treatment
as Civil Service Regulations, since it is nowhere suggested in the Order that
the OMB has the authority, directly or indirectly, to limit the scope of nego-
tiations. See text accompanying notes 52-54 supra. Accord, United Fed'n of
College Teachers, Local 1460 and U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Gov'T
EMP. REL. REP. 21:7019 (1972).
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12(b)(5) right to determine personnel, the latter appears to be su-
perfluous.
E. Merit-Promotion Proposals
Special union interests in methods of promotion may conflict with
the merit concept, which is the cornerstone of the Civil Service Sys-
tem.1i5  This conflict may arise through -the interjection of the un-
ion's special interests into the objective standards that characterize
a merit system of employee promotion and retention. For example,
a seniority proposal could inject a non-merit criterion into the promo-
tion process. Consequently, section 12(b)(2) of the Order ex-
pressly reserves management's right to promote employees. Never-
theless, the Council has been faced with questions on the negotiabil-
ity of union proposals for employee input into -the merit promotion
process. 1 6
In dealing with such proposals the Council has carefully distin-
guished between -the substantive and procedural aspects of the merit
promotion system." 7 In Veteran's Administration Independent
Service Employees Union and Veteran's Administration Research
Hospital,"8 the union proposed that the union steward be allowed
to obtain -the reasons for the selection of an employee to be promoted
and to appeal such selection -to a higher agency official, whose deci-
sion on the promotion was to 'be final." 9  The proposal was 'held
negotiable under section 12(b)(2). 120 The Council noted that while
section 12(b)(2) prohibits union interference with the authority of
management ,to decide and act on promotions, "there is no implica-
tion that . . . [such] authority [was] intended to bar negotiations
of procedures which management will observe in reaching the deci-
sion or taking the action involved, provided that such procedures do
not 'have ,the effect of negating the authority reserved."'' Thus, a
union proposal will be negotiable if it does not require management
115. See generally Veteran's Administration Independent Serv. Employees
Union and Veteran's Administration Research Hosp., Gov'T EMP. REL. REP.
21:7029 (1972).
116. Id.; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 1923 and Social Secur-
ity Administration Headquarters Bureaus and Offices, Gov'T Emp. REL. REP.
21:7087 (1973).
117. See V.A. Research Hospital, GOVT EMP. REL. REP. 21:7029 (1972).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 21:7029-30. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-
CIO, Local 1960 and Naval Air Rework Facility, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP.
21:7143 (1973).
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to negotiate or to secure union consent on -a promotion selection, (,the
substantive aspect of managements right to promote) and does not
unreasonably delay the promotion process. 122
In spite of section 12(b)(2) the Order appears to open a rela-
tively wide path for employee participation and input into the proce-
dures of selecting individuals for promotion. However, a proposal
that passes the Council's substance-procedure test of section
12(b)(2) may still be nonnegotiable if it conflicts with applicable
regulations, such as Civil Service regulations, or any other section of
the Order.123 Nevertheless, in giving the labor organization a voice
in the promotion process, the Council's interpretation of section
12(b) (2) certainly makes the role of the exclusive representative
more meaningful.' 2 4 Because of the Order's structural emphasis of
reserved management rights,' 25 -the Council's interpretation of section
12(b)(2) takes on additional significance. Although the promotion
system may be considered a matter affecting working conditions,
management's reserved right to promote outs across -the bargaining
obligation. Accordingly, the Council could easily have held all union
proposals concerning merit promotions to be nonnegotiable. There-
fore, in finding that certain merit promotion proposals are negotiable,
the Council clearly views the Order as intending to provide broad
scope of negotiations.
122. Id. at 21:7030.
123. See Federal Employees Metal Trades Council of Charleston and
Charleston Naval Shipyard, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7087 (1973), where a
proposal giving the union access to standards used in the formulation of merit
promotion procedures was held nonnegotiable on the ground that it violated
the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel Manual chapter 337, sub-
chapter 3-3, regarding merit promotion procedures, which required that all em-
ployees have equal opportunity for promotion.
124. The Council's attention to making the role of the exclusive representa-
tive meaningful is also reflected in negotiability decisions regarding grievance
procedures. Thus, in American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Local 1668 and
Elmendorf Air Force Base, Gov'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7071 (1973), the
Council ruled that proposals over grievance procedures were negotiable, subject
only to the limitations in the Order. The Council reasoned that since the ex-
clusive representative was responsible for processing grievances on unilaterally
determined working conditions, to permit the agency to establish the grievance
procedure itself would diminish the role of the exclusive representative. Id.
at 7073. Accord, International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers,
Local 830 and U.S. Naval Ordinance Station, GOV'T EMP. REL. RFP. 21:7077
(1973). See also International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
and U.S. Kirk Army Hosp., Gov'T EMP. RL. REP. 21:7005 (1971).
125. Notes 18-23 supra and accompanying text.
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M. CONCLUSION
The history of the federal labor relations program indicates that
the right of employee organizations to bargain collectively with the
governmen-t through its agencies is firmly established. The 'broad ob-
ligation to bargain contained in section 11(a) of Executive Order
11,491 evidences -the sincerity with which the government views its
commitment to the development of a fair and sensible collective bar-
gaining system in the federal service. Nevertheless, the Order con-
tains broad limitations on the scope of negotiations which account,
in part, for the rather significant number of negotiability disputes
which have arisen.1 26
In the main, the Council has demonstrated its unwillingness to
allow the Order to become a shield behind which management may
hide to avoid its bargaining obligation. The decisions permitting ne-
gotiations in the areas of working conditions, work assignments and
overtime, and merit promotions have done much to reform the struc-
tural bias in favor of management implicit in the Order's emphasis
of the limitations on the scope of bargaining. Moreover, it appears
that a 'broad picture of .the permissible scope of negotiations in the
federal service is beginning to take shape. In establishing the bound-
aries, the Council has applied the Order -to preclude negotiations over
union proposals -that arguably interfere with fthose aspects of an
agency's action necessary for -the accomplishment of its mission.
Thus, negotiations over proposals affecting an agency's staffing pat-
terns, the essential ordering of an agency's work force, are nonnego-
tiable. Negotiations over the agency's substantive right -to promote
are similarly prohibited. The practice of having the Civil Service
Commission determine whether a union proposal violates its regula-
tions, 'however, appears to diminish ,the Council's authority in defin-
ing -the permissible scope of negotiations. Moreover, by raising the
potential power of the Office of Management and Budget to limit
the scope of negotiations by issuing directives relating to an-agency's
right to determine ,the methods, means, -and personnel by which its
operations are to be conducted under section 12(b) (5), the Council
has detracted from its generally laudable effort to define the scope
of negotiations.
The emerging picture of the permissible scope of negotiations in
the federal service is clouded, however, by the Order's treatment of
agency-wide regulations. As the Order is presently written, such reg-
126. Remarks of David Selden, President, American Federation of Teach-
ers, reported in Gov'T EM'. REL. RE'. No. 539, at AA-5 (1974).
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ulations provide a vehicle for the unilateral elimination from the
bargaining table of items that would otherwise be negotiable.127 Since
the cornerstone of the Federal Labor-Management Relations Program
is the implementation of bilateral machinery, such as collective bar-
gaining, as a method of problem resolution,128 such a power raises
doubt concerning the efficacy of the Order itself. If management
may unilaterally control the scope of negotiations by the issuance
of an agency-wide regulation, the bargaining obligation becomes so
malleable as to be meaningless. Clearly, the impact of such regula-
tions is a problem that cannot be ignored.
A. A Proposal
As it is presently written, Executive Order 11,491 confers broad
power upon an agency to limit the scope of negotiations by issuing
agency-wide regulations. Accordingly, ,the Order should be modified
so that the scope of -the bargaining obligation may not be changed
by unilateral management action. There are two ways in which
a modification could be achieved within the general framework
of the Order. One would be simply to provide that agency regu-
lations do not preclude negotiations over otherwise negotiable pro-
posals. Such a provision, however, would cut deeply into the right
of agencies to promulgate regulations since it places the Order in
a position that absolutely preempts any agency regulation. More-
over, such a change would run counter -to the position of the 1969
Report that an agency's authority to promulgate regulations must be
retained.12 9 An alternative would be to permit an agency-wide regu-
lation -to limit the scope of negotiations only if the agency could
demonstrate that the regulation was essential to implementation of
the agency's rights under one of the other legitimate exceptions to
the bargaining obligation. For example, agency-wide regulations af-
fecting ithe procedural aspects of merit promotions would be nego-
tiable, whereas agency-wide regulations affecting substantive aspects
of merit promotions would not be. Additionally, it would be open
to the Council to place a high burden of proof on the agency if it
127. See notes 62-69 supra and accompanying text.
128. Ingrassia, The Maturing Federal Labor Management Relationship,
CrviL SERVICE J., Apr.-June 1972, at 6, 8. Mr. Ingrassia is director of labor
management relations for the Civil Sei-vice Commission.
129. PRESIDENT'S STUDY COMMrITEE ON LABoR-MANAGEm:ENT RELATIONS
IN TE FEDERAL SERvIcE: REPORT AND RECOMMIENDATIONS ON LABoR-MAN-
AGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERvIcE § E2 (Aug. 1969) [hereinafter
cited as 1969 REPORT].
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found the danger of undue restrictions on the scope of negotiations
to be great. °30 The latter approach -is clearly preferable, since the
scope of negotiations would not then be subject to restrictions im-
posed by completely uncontrolled management action, as is now -the
case.
This proposed modification would be consistent with the position
of the 1969 Report.'3 ' Under Merchant Marine, regulations di-
rected at a specific activity do not pose a bar to negotiations.' 3 2 The
Order, 'then, does not require that every -agency regulation operate
as a limit on the scope of negotiations, notwithstanding that it 'is pos-
sible for a union to obtain an exemption from such regulations.' 3a
Thus, the restriction on the scope of negotiations posed by agency
regulations need not be given broad effect, a result which is consist-
ent with the 1969 Report's emphasis on avoiding the inhibiting effect
of agency regulations on negotiations. In fact, the Council's decision
in Sheppard Air Base,'34 which rendered a union proposal nonnego-
tiable because of a regulation, was compelled not so much by the
spirit of the Order as by its structure.' 3 5 Thus, the proposed change
would obviate the uncontrolled restrictive effect of agency regulations
on the scope of negotiations by imposing restraints on that restriction,
and would simultaneously preserve -the same degree of deference for
the authority of agencies to promulgate regulations contained in Mer-
chant Marine.
ALEXANDER J. ZIMMER
130. See Local 2219, IBEW, AFL-CIO and Department of Army, Little
Rock Dist., GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7023 (1972).
131. 1969 REPORT, supra note 129, §E2.
132. United Fed'n of College Teachers Local 1460 and U.S. Merchant Ma-
rine Academy, GOV'T EMP. REL. REP. 21:7019 (1972).
133. 1969 REPORT, supra note 129, § E2.
134. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local 779, and Department of
Air Force, Sheppard Air Base, GovT. EMP. REL. RP. 21:7047 (1973).
135. Id. at 7048.
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